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CIVIL PROCEDURE-SPLITTING CAUSE OF AcnoN-VOLUNTARY SETTLEMENT
OF PART OF CAUSE OF ACTION As BAR TO SUIT-Plaintiff suffered bodily injury
and damage to his automobile from a single negligent act of defendant. By
voluntary agreement the parties settled plaintiff's claim as to the property
damage only. Thereafter plaintiff instituted this action to recover damages
for his personal injuries. Defendant pleaded the property settlement as a
bar to the action, and the trial court awarded judgment to defendant. The
intermediate appellate court affirmed. On appeal to the state supreme court,
held, affirmed. A single wrongful act which inflicts personal injury and
property damage gives rise to one cause of action, and a prior judgment for
the property claim or a voluntary settlement thereof will, when pleaded, bar
an action for the personal injuries. Gregory v. Schnurstein, 212 Ga. 497,
93 S.E. (2d) 680 (1956).
The court in the principal case indicates that it recognizes the rule of the
majority of American courts that a cause of action consists of the wrongful
act of defendant rather than the effect thereof, so that one wrongful act
gives rise to one cause of action although plaintiff suffered both personal
and property injuries.1 Plaintiff may bring, therefore, only one suit for his
injuries. If he sues for his property damages, his entire cause of action
is merged in the judgment, and he may not subsequently recover in an ac-

1

King v. Chicago M. &: St. P. R. Co., 80 Minn. 83, 82 N.W. II3 (1900); Mobile &:

0. R. Co. v. Matthews, ll5 Tenn. 172, 91 S.W. 194 (1905); Georgia Ry. &: Power Co. v.

Endsley, 167 Ga. 439, 145 S.E. 851 (1928); Underwood v. Dooley, 197 N.C. 100, 147 S.E.
686 (1929). Contra, e.g., Brunsden v. Humphrey, 14 Q.B. 141 (1884). See 64 A.L.R.
663 at 667 (1929) for a discussion of the rule that a cause of action consists of the effect
of defendant's act on plaintiff.
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tion for the personal injuries.2 The court in the principal case erroneously
concludes, however, that the same rule should be applied when there is a
voluntary settlement of part of plaintiff's claim, i.e., that his caus~ of action
is merged in the voluntary settlement of the property damages, and an action for the personal injuries is thereby barred.3 This result indicates a
failure on the part of the court to appreciate the reason underlying the rule
which precludes splitting a cause of action. To allow plaintiff two recoveries
on the same cause of action subjects defendant to a multiplicity of suits,4
and it is contrary to the public interest to extend litigation which might be
concluded conveniently in one judicial proceeding.5 A voluntary settlement
of part of a cause of action, however, followed by an action on the remainder
subjects defendant to only one suit on the cause of action. The United
States Supreme Court has held that merger of a cause of action in a judgment for part of a claim applies only to the part settled thereby, and will not
bar a subsequent suit for the remainder of the claim if the parties have
agreed that the prior judgment settles only part of the cause of action. 6
If the parties may agree that two suits shall be maintained on one cause
of action, an agreement such as that in the case at bar which results in
extrajudicial settlement of part of the controversy should not necessarily
preclude a single suit on the cause of action. The latter agreement is even
more desirable than the former, for its effect is to settle the controversy in
one action, whereas two actions are necessary in the former situation. There
are few cases dealing directly with the problem of an action for personal
injuries brought subsequent to a voluntary settlement of property damages
resulting from the same wrong of defendant.7 These opinions generally
recognize that the reason for the rule against splitting a cause of action into
two judicial actions does not warrant an application of the rule when the
first settlement is by voluntary agreement rather than by court judgment,8
and state that settlement of part of a cause of action is to be encouraged
since it expedites litigation by eliminating some of the controversy between
2 See 64 A.L.R. 663 (1929) and 127 A.L.R 1081 (1940) for a comprehensive list of
cases invoking the rule against splitting a cause of action.
8 Principal case at 682.
4Emry v. Chappell, 148 N.C. 327, 62 S.E. 411 (1908); 77 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 688 (1929),
5Frankel v. Quaker City Cab Co., 82 Pa. Super. 217 (1923); 77 UNIV. PA. L. R.Ev. 688
(1929).
6 Industrial Commission of Wisconsin v. McCartin, 330 U.S. 662 (1947).
7 Cases in accord with the principal case where settlement was understood to be of
only part of the cause of action: Western & A. R. Co. v. Atkins, 141 Ga. 743, 82 S.E. 139
(1914); Bennett v. Dove, 93 Ga. App. 57, 90 S.E. (2d) 601 (1955); Giles v. Smith, 80 Ga.
App. 540, 56 S.E. (2d) 860 (1949). ·Contra: Bliss v. N. Y. C. & H. R. Co., 160 Mass. 447,
36 N.E. 65 (1894); Frankel v. Quaker City Cab Co., note 5 supra; Bennett v. Bell, 176
Ark. 690, 3 S.W. (2d) 996 (1928). See also Reeves v. Phila. Gas Works, 107 Pa. Super.
422 (1933).
s See cases contra to principal case, note 7 supra. See also O'Bieme v. Lloyd, 43
N.Y. 248 (1870), which states that a voluntary compromise of a part of a contract claim
does not preclude an action for that part of the claim omitted from the settlement when
the parties have made a valid agreement to sever the demand and settle part of it.
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the parties.9 Those decisions which follow the rule of the principal case,
all of which are from Georgia courts, do so either without explanation of
their position or on the erroneous assumption that there is no distinction
between a voluntary settlement of part of a cause of action followed by suit
on the remainder and two suits on the same cause of action.1 Clearly the
result in those cases disregards the reason for the rule against splitting a
cause of action, and is detrimental to the desirable policy of simplifying
litigation by the elimination of issues that can be voluntarily settled.

°

James F. Hillis

Frankel v. Quaker City Cab Co., note 5 supra.
A. R. Co. v. Atkins, note 7 supra; Giles v. Smith, note 7 supra; Bennett
v. Dove, note 7 supra.
9

10 Western &:

